[Ibubanen]

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/67 cont./
pink tint, the plotters' expression of the a. Lh'sen, as well as with the cunning vitality of the Idma. Dirty because of the lack of water, unsightly and feeble, they are decadents. Among their heteroclite elements, a synthesis nevertheless seems to have
[193] played a role. The legend exhibits all the details of a history indefinitely suppressed.

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1) Some blacks, grouped at the foot of a hill with the significant name Awrir i-ysemgan, had their village destroyed by the immigrant Dukkâla (1).

1. At this moment the Bani Mâger, who are Maçmûda, are being driven away from the North bank of the Tensift, Sour. in Port., t. I, pp. 136, No. 2 and 193, n. 1. The present
[648] group of the Al Chichâwa, grouping Berbérophones separated by the Ud Bessebâ from the Chleuh /Shluh/ mass of the Atlas, presents some embarrassing questions, but its existence doubtlessly forms "a bridge" between the Atlas and the more northerly Maçmûda populations, who have now disappeared through migration or Arabization.

Some of them took refuge in a. Abdella, at Talat u Qyar. The rest remained at Tugg Lkheyr; they are the present ait Bumellut', miserable remains, excluded from the distribution of the ground. They live mixed with two a. Lh'sen ikhs-s: remnant of former occupants, forced guests; they are in fact in a state of submission to the a. Lh'sen.

[628] People of aberrant origin, like the ait Abbo of Timskert, living without communication with the others, or like the Inaghayn of Talburt, related to the a. Msseddat of the Tabgurt and struck by a saint's curse, vegetate, without ever exceeding three or four foyers.

/106 cont./

312 648 619 (634) (628) Political, because in this country of concentrated life, the séguia is sometimes intertribal, often intercantonal, and almost always intervillage. The intake of the séguias serving the Dwiran and the Ud Besseba^{c} is found in a. Abdella, at least for most of them. The relations with the Ud Besseba^{c}, an Arab tribe of turbulent character, were aleatory, and, long before the Protectorate, one is already at official regulation of them. "The users of the Wâdî'l-Qâhra and the Ud Besseba^{c} being" -- said a dahir of 1285 Heg.: 1868 -- "found in disagreement, I order that one fifth be reserved for the Ud. Besseba^{c}, the rest being left to the former." On that point at least, the old order was dead: the 631 prince had to intervene. Not far away, this was the case between 312 Mez'ud'a and Gedmiwa. But not between Seksawa and Dwiran. 619 Between these two groups, the relations for the water are governed even today, not only by fixed agreements, but by the "tours de faveur" /turns of favor/, discretionary in appearance, equal in fact on both sides. For the a. Musa depend on the good will of Taddert in Dwiran. The lower Dwiran depends, just for drinking, on that of the a. Abdella. The solidarity, therefore, is not that of the cantons, but of the tribes.

133 The current of the river dries up downstream from Z'init' during all the summer months. It reappears only in more and more intermittent fashion as one goes toward the plain. It is true that some small perennial sources murmur here and there on the banks, and that the bed itself lets waters spring up more or less continually, which attest to a subterranean circulation and even, on the side of Lekhneg, stagnate lazily under the laurels and the /107/ tillirin (1).

1. Inula viscosa.

312 But the width of the bed, its permeability, which vast banks of sand and gravel, ikrirs (a. Abdella), or ikri (middle Seksawa), indicate, no longer permit, from a certain date, a profitable, let us say, progress of the water. It is thus higher and higher upstream, as the dryness becomes accentuated, that plains irrigation will go to seek its blessing, and that by artificial conduits: the

/107 cont./
624 immediate sanctions, and calling for its /108/ own application,
312 without discussion or appeal (1).

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1. J. Costa, Colectivismo agrario in España /Agrarian collectivism in Spain/, 1915, pp. 541 sq., also observes that the famous Water Tribunal of Valencia, the Cort de la Seo, is a very amicable jurisdiction. Conflict could, at any moment, be removed to a judiciary instance, but that never happened!

is glimpsed here. It sanctions a certain number of what we shall
624 call principles. For example, the upstream-downstream direc-
312 tion is the direction that governs the continuity of the irrigation,
578 and can, in case of conflicts between groups, give rise to au-
628 thoritarian application by the power. Thus the old legal dispute between Gedmiwa and Mez'ud'a, for the séguias of the asif el-Mâl. Such a rule implies on the part of the upstream irrigator, whom it favors, some discretion, community honor, care not to harm the people below. That generally suffices among fellow
628 citizens. It is the primary step. Beyond that, there are agree-
312 ments between groups. Most often, they manifest very old bal-
578 ances and a statutory constancy. But occasionally also they are more circumstantial: subject to mercenary debate or also to ritual
[754] proceedings. A part of the water is bought, unless it is obtained by the "injunction" of the âr (2).

2. Cf. E. Westermarck, Ritual and belief in Morocco, 1926, t. I, pp. 518 sq.

[648] This is what happened in a. Musa for the use of the water from Aduz, in Ud Besseba[c] for obtaining supplementary portions from the séguias of the Seksawa or the Dwiran. This is what happens generally at the time of the floods: the unforeseeability of a windfall determines modes of distribution that amply go beyond any strict regularity.

/116 cont./
000 etc., failed, hardly later than 1930, to start a violent conflict.
175 In the hegemonic action of the Mtuggi, the control of the lands
221 of transhumance and of the markets of the Dir gave the advan-
233 tage to the power of the plain, which used it wonderfully well to
[628] negotiate: shrewd discriminations, flexible finances, preferential
tariffs, all with a wide margin of abuse and individual transac-
[178] tion. These traits have disappeared since the pacification. By
[481] the same stroke, some routes of transhumance have been aban-
doned, the security opening other, more advantageous ones.
"That is why the Idaw Mh'mud abandoned the pasturages of the
Mtugga, why the a."H'adduyws gave up the Dir of the Dwiran to
go to pasture on the Jbayl. These two former routes of transhu-
mance, indicated by M. J. Dresch, were no longer being used
already in 1941, when the work mentioning them appeared. It
[69] is even probable that the second was used only exceptionally in
the acute periods of the siba (1)."

1. Unpublished study by L. Robine on La transhumance dans la région d'Imintanout, 1949. Our debt with regard to him is considerable for this part of the account.

571 This "fiscality" of the great caids -- anachronistic word, of
431 course -- leads one to envisage the relations between the trans-
233 humant and his correspondent in the plain: çaheb or amddak-
221 k^{w}el. Whether they /117/ were individual or group, they no
longer arise from a debated contract, but from the exchange of
favors or of "sweetnesses," to speak like these rural people.
Hence, an ensemble of relations calling for, on the part of the
man of the plain, security for the montagnard and authorization
to share the pasture, in a general collective: it is a provisional
naturalization. The montagnard assumes the attitude of the
grateful beneficiary and of the protégé. At the time of his ar-
rival, he presents luqfa (from an Arabic root signifying "to set up"
/Fr. dresser/, corresponding to the Chleuh /Shluh/ sbidd, a verb
used in the expression sbidd l^{c}âr, "to enjoin riturally" -- but here

[Ait Musa Ufella]

/199 cont./

423 178 consequence of which has been to accentuate the differences in level among those having rights. This differentiation, working in a milieu with a precarious economy, has reacted on the vitality of the subject and on the rural countryside.

D) The basin of Tabratjut

634 133 This is the domain of the a. Musa of upper Ufella, just downstream from the parvis of Lalla Aziza. This location, too accessible from the plain, too vulnerable to the mountain, which besieges rather than defends it, has re-echoed on the history of land.

175 634 648 Here there was a Babylonian captivity. The captives were the "caid" Lh'sen Chtittihi and his followers. Babylon was the place of asylum of Z'init'. The exile lasted about twenty years. It was only at the time of the pacification /200/ of 1927 that, at the demand of the French authorities, the a. Lh'sen withdrew from the conquered country, which was returned to the legitimacy. But it was to fall into a landed-property litigation concerning registering, fortunately settled in favor of the indigene by our Cour d'Appel /Court of Appeals/. In sum, for a generation, the a. Musa from above saw their Tabratjut ground delivered up without cessation to the usurpations of ancient type and of modern type; eviction by stamped paper threatened to succeed conquest by the sword. And they continued only by the understanding of the judge to escape ruin definitively.

312 The basin forms a series of tiered esplanades, according to an arrangement of the river bed which is always found, although in a fashion unequally clear and continuous, from the bottom to the top of the Seksawa. On the Tabratjut side, the two lower levels are marked by a vegetation with two contrasting shades, expressing two planes of irrigation. Downwards, it is the "great channel," targa imqqurn, coming from the river, and constant, but insufficient. Higher, at the base of the towering reliefs, it [628] is the séguia from Aduz (Haut Dwiran), but the use of which depends on the good will of these neighbors. Thus a whole part of

[Ait Musa Ufella]

312 428 782 /200 cont./ Thus a whole part of the agriculture of the a. Musa depends on relations of neighborliness and propitiatory sacrifices which are made each time, in case of need, to the marabouts of Aduz. This irregularity, with 312 423 613 phases of unconditional abundance when the ditch runs high, and of restriction or even scarcity, results in the fact that the administration of the water does not correspond to a division among ikhs-s. The water is distributed either at the discretion of each one or, in case of need, by small groups of contiguous parcels, s-irubba. No "turn" properly speaking.

Distribution of the quarters among ikhs-s
in the terrain of the ait Musa Ufella (Fig. 9)

1) List of the names of ikhs:

a) Ait Chtittihi.
b) Ait Bu-setta.
c) Ait J'j'amid.
d) Ait Watchaw.
e) Ait H'mad.
f) Ait Jjaw.
g) Imzilen.
h) Ait Si Addi.
i) Ait Wabgur.
j) Ait Umazwur.
k) Ait Wakrim.
l) Ait Mzird'ad'.
m) Ait Lkessas.
n) Ait Imij.
o) Ait Lmekhtar.
p) Ait H'sayn.
q) Ait H'med u Jibbu.
r) Ait u Châîb.

2) List of the names of quarters:

1. Tameselnt.
2. Amnayn.
3. Ddu-Wanghemmi.
4. Tkunt.
5. Targa meqqurn.
6. Agergiwn.
7. Igidar.
8. Imi n-talat.
9. Imlaln-an.
10. Tariat't' n-Dlaâli.
11. Imiri y-igwrramen.
12. Ddu-wjjin.
13. Imi n-urtan-an.
14. Tikid'a n-ait Brahim.
15. Talat n-Teddart.
16. Lmegzart.
17. Imejjad'-an.
18. Aryad'n-an.
19. Ult-teskri.
20. Azarn-an.
21. Timejderra.
22. Igherman-an.
23. Dar u- Weswik.
24. Lemkhazin.
25. Imi n-tebratjut.
26. Iussran.
27. Ddu-wgwadir.
28. Ibh'ir.
29. Inebdar.
30. Ameslen.
31. Timzughin.
32. Tukhribin.

/269 cont./

796 792 728 security for the civic life of the Idma: elections, warlike or peaceful proceedings, etc. Sometimes, and this is an interesting case, the intervention presents a more precise character, that of legislation. I find a detailed example of this only in the Haut /Upper/ Dwiran, truthfully speaking contiguous to our domain. According to an act of 1052 Heg.: 1642, Sidi ᶜAbd al-Karîm al-Masnâwî (1)

> 1. Is this nasab to be compared to the one that certain members of the Zaouia of Dilâ' bore precisely during this period? The coincidence would be disturbing.

codified the relations between the a. Rrays and the a. Mezgur. [681] [628] This is a penal tariffication of the ordinary type, but offering the originality of resulting from an agreement between villages, under a saint's ministry.

793 796 The role of these personages in the assembly of rather vast groups by an operation which is properly a foundation has not, truthfully speaking, given rise among the Seksawa, whose monarchic unification undoubtedly goes back at least to the thirteenth century, to legends as typical as, for example, that of Sidi Brahim of Tighanimin in the I. T'anan (2).

> 2. Very rich legend of a founding saint, recorded by De Leyris, "Le mariage en Idaw T'anan /Marriage in Idaw T'anan/," in. /unpublished/ CHEAM, 1950. This theme of the foundation is current in North Africa. The most celebrated case is that of Moulay Idris. But it is not the clearest, owing to a powerful urban etiology. Analysis will be simpler in the case of synoecisms of bourgs or of rural groups. Cf., for example, C. Trumelet, L'Algérie légendaire, 1892, pp. 118, 121, 180, 181, 184, etc., and Les saints

/269 cont./

773 776 /footnote 2 continued/ de l'Islam, 1881, pp. 234, 241, 336. R. Montagne, Les Berbères et le Makhzen dans le Sud du Maroc /The Berbers and the Makhzan in the South of Morocco/, 1930, p. 169.

(628) But the equilibrium between groups, although of complex base, often lets one perceive its hagiological guarantees. That is conjectured in the story of the elimination of the a. Gasa, brought about, to the profit of the Idma, by a malediction, ddu ᶜâ, of the saint of Z'init'.

776 794 The dues to the saints take on either a commutative or a supererogatory and facultative aspect. The passage from one of these forms to the other is seen particularly in the sense of the weakening of an originally stipulated obligation, which becomes a voluntary gift. /270/ It is in this way that, beneficiaries of an ancient chchard', the a. Sograti of the Haut Dwiran reap no more in a. Musa than facultative presents upon application. In addition, it happens that the same saint collects contractual dues on some products, and only facultative ones on others. Thus for Lalla Aziza who, titulary in Haut a. Musa of a cens on the cereals, collects only at the discretion of the donors a jumuᶜa of butter, that is, the pat churned during the first Friday of the milking season.

To this complexity of content are added other nuances, those that result from infinite variations between cantonal subdivisions concerning the service of the saints. We shall indicate some of them farther below.

In what concerns the recipients of the chchard', new diversity. It is in this way that the a. Musa honor as Seksawa saints Lalla Aziza and Sidi Mh'and. But they adjoin to them a peripheric saint, Sidi bu Abdelli, from Messid in Dwiran, who collects a quarter of a measure of barley per ghrâra, "load," a kharruba of maize per foyer, plus a goat. On the first Sunday in April, at the zaouia of Talâint, the Regraga profit by a ddurt, "end-of-cycle feast," said to be from Sidi Bukhâri, begun in Chyâd'ma.

/373 cont./

682 And they express a climate completely different from private vengeance. And here are some examples:

175 683 /The following seven paragraphs are in small type in the original source./ Ammern, 1232 Heg.: 1817. A specialist in the examination of wounds (we would say that he evaluates "incapacities") sets the idemnity, leqçaç, corresponding to the loss of an eye. It is a sum of money, it is not the eye of the guilty one!

Ammern, 1167 Heg.: 1754. A father, afflicted by a prodigal and quarrelsome son, settles 80 o. for his account and henceforth disengages himself, min jamᶜ umur as-sufahâ' wa jamᶜ il-achrâr, if henceforth the young man should occasion: youthful follies, wounds and bruises inflicted upon others, and for which the old man indemnifies a series of victims for the past, by contract in a way.

175 681 Ammern, 1166 Heg.: 1753. A divorced woman has been sentenced to a heavy fine, 30 o. A third party pays it for her, not without acquiring, it seems, certain rights over the guilty one. In any case, from then on, he relieves her of all responsibility, "as the jackal is relieved of that for the blood of Joseph," picturesque Biblical reminder.

175 683 Tasa, 1242 Heg.: 1827. An expert evaluates the wound, the result of an "act of destiny" inflicted by Lh'sen Ubaha (a euphemism to designate the guilty one), "concerning the head of the old Sâid Wakrim." Valuation.

Fatwa of the son of sidi Lh'sen u Tiqqi (1147 Heg.: 1735). The rate applicable to a facial wound is evaluated at 1/12 of the dîâ, in other words 72 mithqâl-s; in coin, ᶜabbâsîya. This by reference to Khalîl!

175 682 [623] [628] An agreement of 1274 Heg.: 1858 between the jemâa-s of the villages of Tamt'ddit, Tagunit, Tinwalin, Tamezgurt (the Imt'ddan tetrapolis). The piece is written by the hand of the marabout of Asttif, sidi Abdallah b. Ah'med. It is agreed that the dîâ for voluntary or involuntary homicide is 100 mithqâl-s.

/395 cont./

competitions of the group, the number of affairs where a good objective law could have made victory anticipated before a jurisdiction likewise objective -- but is it? -- is ludicrously small compared to that of the mad instances that hatred, appetite, fidelity impose. An instinctive realism thus governs the indefinite reconduction of litigations rather than a decision that would close debate, and dry up life.

Nevertheless, out of this confusion of passions and interests, of subtleties and angers, finally rises a sort of equilibrium. It is formed from the constancy that opposes indefinitely, that is to say, maintains in their respective positions, the rival factions. Tension becomes safeguard. Vengeance, the momentary possession of power, the success of a judicial stratagem compensate for, for a few moments, a few years, a few generations, the phases of persecution, poverty, or exile. The justice of this society thus governs the free exercise of each of the two terms of the alternative.

An appeal to outside intervention, which would consolidate one or the other, is properly inexpiable treason. Whence the rigorous penalties that the canton codifications devote to it: heavy fines, banishment, death. But let us not exaggerate. To enter into understandings with the neighbor, against the communal adversary, is a constant solicitation between these homogeneous cantons, bound by obscure solidarities. Neither would peace offer here the security that this word arouses in a modern mind, nor war the unconditional violence and leap into the unknown that it is for us. Here war is but an infraction of the rules of the game. But it is also the recourse to a larger game. Rapine and vengeance /396/ are practiced in the one case as well as in the other one. More than individuals, it is families who are the protagonists. Exactly like the Fabia gens, certain ones carry on alliances and rivalries by themselves. War is the prolongation of municipal tensions. Unless, inversely, they result from larger disputes. To what therefore does the notion of taqbilt correspond, on both sides of which are disposed the one and the other tension, thus similar and interdependent, and to what extent does it constitute a

/16 cont./

133 491 [492] more than 3,000 meters of altitude with their mules, difficult roads that, in addition, are enlivened by the passage of the women, children, and flocks.

[233] [438] The transhumance of the sheep and goats, the exchange of the walnuts, wool, and almonds of the high valleys for the grain, tea, sugar, and manufactured objects from the souks /sooks/ of the Dir maintain the continuity of these relations. The activity observed on these crests during the days of spring and summer is enough to make one understand the importance of the bonds that unite plain and mountain.

In vain does the internal partitioning of the valleys, which the successive tiers of the Atlas cut up into separate basins and seal up by gorges, isolate the villages one from another. In * [634] [578] [437] spite of the reciprocal hostility of the Berbère /Berber/ cantons on the same route of passage, one sees alliances established at great distances, from the North to the South, in the direction followed by the transverse routes of the mountains. The small states of the summits are associated with the villages of the last slopes or of the plain in the same way.

361 •628 [487] [438] On the other hand, relations are difficult between villages established at the same altitude in the parallel valleys, and only goat paths permit passing from one to the other; besides, since economic exchanges between the neighboring populations who live under identical conditions are of no interest, one understands that the political horizon of the small mountain states, so extended toward the North or toward the South, in the direction of the plain of Marrakech or the interior plain of the Sous, is, on the other hand, toward the East or toward the West limited for each of them to the closest villages.

491 VIII. The mountain massifs. -- The role of these great routes of passage that cross the two chains is not only /17/ to facilitate the moving of people and economic activity. They [184] cut the Atlas and Anti-Atlas into separate massifs, inside which the material and social life of the tribes takes on peculiar forms, which give each of them a true originality and explain the

/124 cont./

*631 159 the brother of El Hiba, sultan of the holy war in the South, and the son of Ma el ʿAïnin, sorcerer and theologian who left the desert of Mauritania twenty years ago to help the Sultan drive the Christians from the Empire. By his presence, this false sherif gives the revolt in which the tribes of the western Anti-Atlas persist the excuse of legality. Thus his existence confirms, even for the dissident region, our first impression of a Southern Morocco organized in a uniform manner into great commands according to rules of geographical division that are both simple and clear.

II. The internal organization of the great commands. --

*631 Let us proceed further with the appearances, alone observable for the moment, in order to understand, thanks to our guides, the external aspects of this political organization of the great kaids, which seems so different from that of the other Berbère /Berber/ countries of North Africa.

Although the great chiefs of the Atlas are subject to the Sultan and sometimes invoke his name to justify their conquests, we see, by the firm domination that they exercise over the mountain tribes, that their personal authority is much stronger than that of the ephemeral kaids of the plains of the North. We might have been tempted at first to think that these chiefs must be /125/ limited in the exercise of their command by the local institutions, whose democratic tendencies are so marked in other regions, such as the Rif, the Kabylie /Kabylia/, and the Aurès; but, on the contrary, the masters of the tribes seem to us to form here a veritable aristocratic and feudal class, established above the populations that they govern. When these mountain kaids assemble [628] their warriors, as during the reign of Moulay ʿAbd el ʿAziz, in [721] order to settle their quarrels among themselves, they disturb the whole country, without anyone's being able to intervene in order to stop their dissensions; if the Empire weakens, one sees them descending to the plains to fight over the rich regions of the Azaghar of Marrakech, to compete in order to get the government of the capital of the South and to protect the ruler. Even [152] when the lords of the Atlas return to their high valleys, they are still to be feared, and nobody knows exactly the limit of their

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*634 They settled a certain number of their new friends in their vil-
616 lages, giving them, as is the custom, provisions and livestock.
722 These strangers lived at first in peace in the "taqbilt" that had adopted them; but soon the reaction of the nearby fractions of the same leff against this forgetting of the rules of the alliance became so strong that it was necessary to make them leave the country in order to avoid war. They were quartered first in the lower villages of the valley, in Tamsoult and Tanammert; then, in 1899, they were definitively expelled from the canton of the Iwonsekten.

616 V. The leffs during peace. -- The leffs are not solely sys-
574 tems of military alliances. Each year at the end of the summer
*634 there are given among neighboring "taqbilt" big feasts that con-
•628 tribute toward maintaining the feeling of the fraternity of the leffs. These are the "tinoubga" (1).

1. From the Berbère /Berber/ "anebgi": host.

About 50 warriors, armed and designated by the "moqaddem," leave the tribe in order to carry out a great circuit of hospitality among the sister republics; they take along some provisions of sugar and sheep. Their /191/ brothers of the neighboring republics, in welcoming them, tell them, after the first evening: "You have in the tribe 15 days of tinoubga, see with us what villages we shall visit." Then the feasts begin and succeed one another from hamlet to hamlet, according to the program agreed upon. Above
616 all they execute the war dance of the "Aït Tskawin" in which
574 figure about 15 young men dressed in a full tunic of white cotton
*634 and who carry on their shoulder a silver powder-horn called
628 "tiskt" (plur. teskawin). They group themselves in a circle
535 around a "reis" and execute a sort of rhythmic parade, whose figures differ very much from those of the other dances of the tribe. The horn carried by each of the dancers is an object carefully preserved in each family, and it is often forbidden to sell it; it

/191 cont./

616 is handed down from father to son. The "A'lt Teskawin" never
514 dance while mingling with the other warriors of the tribe, but
*634 they stay around their "reis," who animates them with songs in
•628 which he celebrates the military records of his leff (1).
535
[533]

1. The opposite of the dance of the "Teskawin," the "ahwach" and the "assega," are pacific dances that above all have the aim of permitting men, women, and girls to gather together and exchange, through transparent allusions, epigrams in which love takes first place.

[184] The tradition of the "Teskawin" is still preserved among the
[178] populations of the high valleys, where independence has enabled people to respect up to these last years the institutions of former times. The Aghbar, the Seksawa, the Ida ou Mhamoud, the isolated "taqbilt" of the high mountains of the Gedmiwa keep it as a symbol and are attached to it with the feeling that it expresses their fidelity to the leff alliances.

616 The "Tinoubga" become the origin of many private associa-
574 tions, of alliances of families, and of marriages. Indeed, each
584 one looks for a wife, preferably in his own leff, although it is not
571 without precedent to see families of two opposing parties unite;
582 in that case, it can happen that a man might be led to taking up arms against his son-in-law or his grandchildren, for the leff outweighs private alliances.

616 Among the cantons of the same leff -- those of the high
*634 mountains and those of the Dir -- are also established economic
311 relations of great importance. In the former are found rich /192/
241 summer pastures, harvests of walnuts, wool in abundance, but
233 barley and maize are lacking, for land is scarce in the encased valleys. On the other hand, the cantons of the Dir have at their feet enormous areas that can be cultivated in "bour" as well as irrigated fields, but the flocks cannot exist in the plain in the

554 /224 cont./
*634
[692] /footnote 2 continued/ sullied by partiality than that of the inflas, whose rapacity is feared.

[585] Marriages and divorces are concluded in his presence. He con-
[586] ducts the proceedings for the apportionment of inheritances and
[428] then appropriates a small part of the estates. He punishes ac-
[681] cording to the ʿorf -- the custom -- crimes and offenses, and imposes the fines that are proper for each mistake. The money thus collected is divided into three parts: the first goes to the moqaddem; the second is for the taqbilt, which the inflas consider that they represent completely in this circumstance; the last part constitutes a small reserve fund for the expenses of hospitality.

The moqaddem's authority varies according to his wealth
[292] and personal situation. If he is already, because of the power
[613] of his "ikhs," an important notable, he is seen, clothed in garb
[591] /225/ of white wool, which manifests his high rank, to delib-
[754] erate, to fix the round of hospitality, to accept the "ʿar"
[574] /protector relationship based on a conditional curse/ of foreigners
[431] who ask for protection, and to have given to one who offers him
[628] a sacrifice some grain and walnuts by contribution of the whole
[574] canton. He concludes alliances with neighboring cantons and presides at the "tinoubga," festivals given on the occasion of visits by foreign warriors. If the moqaddem, on the contrary, is a man without influence, he effaces himself before the "inflas" or the "ʿawan," who compete to have all the disputes settled to the advantage of their family. When the year has passed, the
[666] moqaddem brings the inflas together and calls for his replacement. As an exception his post is renewed for a year, "if his magistrature has been happy," but never longer.

[198] As a result of the general tendency toward the development of personal power, people in the Haut-Atlas /High Atlas/ in our day somewhat scorn the effaced moqaddems who abide by the ancient tradition, according to which they would be only the agents of their brothers. One who does not know how to speak

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*634 passive resistance and only try to avoid any direct relation with
648 the representatives of the central power. On their side, the kaids
[651] generally content themselves with claiming the traditional
[431] she-mule each year, the sending of which is equivalent to theoretical recognition of their power, and fear to venture in force into the region of the summits (1).

1. The "taqbilt" of the right tributaries of the Asif Nefis were still designated up to the middle of the nineteenth century in the fractioning of the Makhzen by the name of "Aserdoun," or he-mule, because their contribution was limited to a he-mule offered to the kaid as hédia /gift/ on the occasion of the great festivals.

*634 Most often the gravest peril that threatens the life of the
578 small independent republics of the Haut-Atlas and the Anti-Atlas
726 is not conquest by the Makhzen /makhzan/, but internal discord
•628 and the development of private wars that have as a consequence the formation of soffs. Of all the montagnards, the Seksawa are the ones most inclined to discord. "They have," it is said, "in their hearts what is in the heart of the jackal, they dream only of devouring each other" (2).

2. F. de La Chapelle (Notices inédites sur les tribus dissidentes du commandement des Mtougga /Unpublished notes on the dissident tribes of the Mtougga command/).

Nevertheless private war does not attain in this region the importance that it assumes in the Rif and in Kabylie /Kabylia/. When it is prolonged, the defeated village sometimes disappears and leaves no more than a heap of ruins; but, on the whole, the social life is not altered and internal anarchy is not seen to develop as in the north of Morocco. Apparently the causes of discord are often

/232 cont./

*634 most trifling: a discussion turns sour, one passes on to insults,
578 then to blows. The people of the village take sides, shots burst
726 forth, and each one goes back into his house to prepare for war.
• 628 But, before opening hostilities, the principal notables hasten to
[571] form, thanks to family alliances or a price in money, a power-
ful party capable of assuring them success. The two soffs fight sometimes for weeks, until an arrangement, which often takes into account the unequal number of victims on each side and the blood price claimed by the families, intervenes to re-establish peace.

/233/ Alliance pacts established by means of the exchange of clothes or "belgha" are not in use among the sedentary peoples
[571] of the South of Morocco. They are satisfied to look for allies by
[782] making them an "ʿar" /putting them in the relationship of protector/ by means of a sacrifice offered on the threshold of their house.

*634 The causes, insignificant in appearance, of the war of the
578 soffs most often mask the rivalries of the notables who fight over
571 power. The quarrel of the villages is for them only a pretext for
726 measuring their strength. Nevertheless, since this struggle im-
628 perils the unity and the strength of the State, the other heads of families often intervene as mediators, in order, they say, that the tribe will not be weakened (1).

1. Compare Sitte und Recht /Custom and Law/, Todgha, p. 149.

*634 In the Haut-Atlas, as well as in Kabylie /Kabylia/ (2),
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[171] the surest means of restoring order in a canton divided against itself is to revive ancient hatreds against the neighboring republics and to find again an occasion to appeal to the brotherhood of the leffs. Here again the causes of the war are trifling: insults

2. Hanoteau and Letourneux, La Kabylie /Kabylia/, Vol. II, p. 64.

/233 cont./

*634 addressed to women who are picking up wood at the boundaries
578 of the country, pasture dispute, theft in a souk /sook/, suffice
726 to revive the memory of ancient discords and to draw up, for
628 several years, the "Indghertit" against the "Imsifern," the "Aït Atman" against the "Aït Iraten." Besides, the combats are not murderous. The warriors betake themselves to a place consecrated by tradition for the settling of disputes, and they exchange
*634 shots indefinitely. It is exceptional that a powerful alliance
578 would succeed in suddenly defeating an enemy republic; in that
628 case, a village is destroyed, but the women and children are al-
727 ways spared. When success crowns the efforts of the assailants, everyone rushes to the pillage. The love of booty was enough,
[181] at the time of the Almohades, to carry along all the tribes of the Haut-Atlas to the conquest of Morocco; to see this passion of the Berbère /Berber/ for pillage being exercised, one understands the violence of the efforts that he can supply to satisfy it, and the advantage that a clever chief can draw from it.

*634 IX. The festivities and the dances. -- Ceaselessly led to
571 react against the internal divisions by calling on the bonds of
578 brotherhood, /234/ the families associated to form an independ-
182 ent "taqbilt" try in all circumstances, doubtless unknown to
796 them, to recreate unity by means of collective ceremonies: "tinoubga," dances, religious and traditional festivities, annual mousem. The social utility of these rejoicings appears all the more as one penetrates further into the social life of these small groups perpetually threatened with scission, and one understands that attendance at these festivities often takes on an obligatory and ritualistic character (1).

1. In certain fractions the notables hold the list of the girls who dance and can be summoned at the time of tribal festivities.

621 Within the "mouda^{c}," each festival of the year, "^{c}Aïd es Seghir,"
632 "^{c}Aïd el Kebir," "^{c}Achoura," as well as marriages or
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*634 697 671 /283 cont./ for repressing crimes and offenses, by the old law of the "taqbilt," in which the only penalties envisaged are death, exile, and a fine.

*634 616 182 This absence of proper institutions suffices to show how the regime of the amghars represents, at least so long as they remain mere leff chiefs, a transitory and precarious form of political organization. Too close to their brothers to separate from them, they remain enslaved by the traditional rules that they violated by seizing power. They will have to break the bonds of the leffs to succeed in freeing themselves.

*634 616 726 VIII. The amghars and the policy of the leffs. -- For the reasons that we have indicated, the first consequence of the establishment /284/ of personal power is a recrudescence of external wars. The hate of the leffs is exacerbated, and in the course of these struggles one often sees veritable massacres of the defeated take place. We shall soon tell how, about 1870, the amghar Mohammed of Tagontaft had 60 notables from the leff of the "Aït Atmah" killed by having their throats cut, when they were assembled with weapons in the house of his enemy, the amghar Achefar of Tagemout. Only a few years ago, before the conquest of the Souktana by the chiefs of Telwet, more than 100 men were likewise killed like sheep, after having been reduced by thirst in the agadir of Ighri. The internal wars were then caused in this tribe by the dissensions of the amghars, which were to facilitate the arrival of the Glawa.

During this period of political evolution the spirit of solidarity of each of the two opposite sides is thus reinforced, the "taqbilt" are united in war as if they really formed a single family. When the amghar Si Mokhtar Seksawi, of the fraction [682] of the Aït Lhasen, had had his benefactor, the kaid Chtittihi, chief of the Aït Mousa, assassinated, he confiscated all his [628] property and plowed his fields. But when he wanted to pay the blood price, it was to the leff brothers of his victim that he paid the money.

[178] Nevertheless, a prompt weakening soon follows the fever of the first years. As soon as the resources of the amghar are

/306 cont./

343 712 [625] village, happened to be at the center of a cirque forming a resonator, the guards would hear any suspicious noises; in this case they would fire a few gunshots and help would arrive from the village; the prowlers would then run away. No one remembers that a theft has been committed in this agadir.

Agadir of Ankoutouf (Figs. 6, 7 and Fig. 14). -- It has 90 chambers, 60 of which are used, and three stories. It is especially well constructed and maintained. [621] It is the agadir of the village of Ankoutouf (48 hearths). Each hearth owns one to [423] three chambers; property deeds attest to these rights. Four [628] rooms are mortgaged, for a price that goes from 8 to 15 douros, [426] to some natives of Tizza, a village that does not have an agadir.

Each owner has the key to his rooms. The guard, who lives 343 712 inside the agadir with his family, has the key to the outer gate. He is appointed for a year as a rule and is changed in October; 625 in general /307/ /Figs. 1 and 2 appear here/ /308 is blank/ /309/ /Figs. 3 and 4 appear here/ /310 is blank/ /311/ he [465] stays longer if people are satisfied with his services. He receives a rba of barley per year and per occupied chamber. In case of 343 712 theft, the thief, if he is discovered, repays the amount of the theft and pays 50 douros as a fine. The responsibility of the 685 guard is involved only if the theft was committed after breaking 625 open the outer gate -- and in this case it is he who repays the amount of the theft and pays 50 douros as a fine; but if the thief found his way in through a breach made in the wall, the guard is not troubled. The fine is divided among the owners of the rooms. Since no check is made of the quantities stored in the rooms, the victim must, in case of theft, swear along with 24 coswearers in order to certify what has been taken from him.

343 712 [621] Agadir of Tanout (Fig. 5 and Fig. 15). -- Belongs to the village of Tanout (57 hearths). It contains 70 chambers on two or three stories. The two borjs /lookout towers/ are empty.

Same interior arrangements and operation as at Ankoutouf.

4: Hoffman E-4 (no date) 1967 MW11 Shluh MW11 (ca. 1900)

000 women. In this way there are generally two sides fighting each other before the day is over, and they stay there and fight until one side has won. If the tribal council wins and succeeds in burning the house of the murderer, it burns the rest of the houses of the *bone* as well, and cuts down as many of its trees as it desires.

The *bone* then flees in a body to another fifth, to another tribe, or out of the Rif entirely. If the members, thinking already of vengeance, cannot stand the sight of their trees being cut down and their houses caved in, they select a bull from the herd which they are driving into exile with them and entrust it to the leader of the mosque or to a student, who leads it back into the presence of the tribal council and slaughters it there [thereby "casting" an *'ar* upon them]. If this is done the tribal council is compelled to let them go back again and to permit them to pay the fine. Once the bull is slaughtered the tree-cutting and other destruction must cease. Many *bones* are too proud either to pay or to send a bull, so that they become destitute and homeless through their pride, providing they are not strong enough to defend themselves against the tribal council... (Coon, 1931, pp. 104-105).

628 As a result of these attitudes and institutions, vendetta warfare was the normal state of existence throughout much of the Berber highlands before the French Protectorate (Loubignac, 1942, p. 286).

d. *Council Presidents or "Chiefs"*

623 554 634 635 As indicated above, almost all representative councils have presiding officers known variously as *moqademin* (pl. of *moqaddem*), *imgharin* (pl. of *amghar*), or *shiukh* (pl. of *sheikh*). In the traditional Berber republic this individual was only *primus inter pares*; he executed the wishes of the council, and he depended largely upon his personal qualities of moderation, persuasion, intelligence, and good luck. If he attempted to abuse his power the council punished [687] him by a heavy fine, by burning his house or tent, or even putting 634 him to death. Despite the threat of these sanctions, the tribal or 635 district *jemaa* usually had to watch its president most carefully lest 554 he usurp power or establish himself permanently (Doutté, 1905; Montagne, 1930, pp. 224-225).

The powers and functions of the council president throughout most of the Berber country have been well described by Loubignac, who we will here follow closely. Of the various council presidents the most important were those of the independent district (among

4: Hoffman E-4 (no date) 1967 MW11 Shluh MW11 (ca. 1900)

2. *Alliances and Agencies for Negotiation and Arbitration*

The traditional social units of Moroccan rural society, involving increasing segmentation as one moves from the confederation or the tribe to the extended family, do not easily lend themselves to the maintenance of peace and harmony. In the pre-Protectorate period rivalries between different blood groups, strong regionalism, and the attitude that insults to "honor" were best avenged by the vendetta, all tended to override the sense of unity derived from geographical proximity, the use of common markets, and brotherhood in Islam. This tendency was rendered all the more critical in the Berber areas by this ethnic group's traditional antipathy towards any form of centralized political authority.

In the Berber areas these centrifugal forces were traditionally countered and controlled by an elaborate system of religiously inviolable alliances combined with an equally elaborate system of "checks and balances" and agencies for the negotiation, mediation, and arbitration of disputes. These compensating factors, although somewhat slow in operation and therefore often ineffective in preventing local social disturbance, did generally contain the dispute within a small area and thus limit its consequences. Similar institutions were also present in the Arabic-speaking areas of the *Bled el Makhzen*, although some suffered suppression at the hands of the central authority.

a. *Shame Compulsions and Covenants*

In the absence of a central authority with strong police powers, interpersonal and intergroup relationships and alliances in both pre-Protectorate Berber and Arabic-speaking society were rendered binding and inviolable through the use of religious shame compulsion (*'ar*) and covenant (*'ahd*). In Morocco the word *'ar* implies the transference of a conditional curse for the purpose of compelling somebody to grant a request, the power of the conditional curse deriving from the mysterious power inherent in the curse (which may sometimes be reinforced by the invocation of another supernatural power or object). Thus, if a person says to another, *Ha l-'ar alik*, "Here is *'ar* upon you", it implies that if

4: Hoffman E-4 (no date) 1967 MW11 Shluh MW11 (ca. 1900)

571 563 which would exist if they were collateral kinsmen. Such a relationship, established by a covenant, may have a military purpose, a number of families within a village forming alliances for mutual defense or to increase their strength for purposes of vengeance. If [621] such a military alliance is formed in response to an act perpetrated within the village, it is usually countered by a second, so that the entire village becomes divided into two rival divisions, known as *sof* in Arabic and as *ameqqon* in Tashilhait. Such a polarization of the village is not an inevitable consequence of the use of the alliance mechanism, however, for the alliance may also have as its purpose such peaceful goals as the sharing of irrigated farmland or pastureland (Bruno and Bousquet, 1946, pp. 364-365; Marcy, 1929, p. 141; Montagne, 1931, p. 196; Westermarck, 1926, Vol. 1, pp. 564-565).

The concept of the alliance of individuals and families through a bond of brotherhood is extended further to the concept of the alliance by brotherhood of larger groups. Two general cases occur; 628 571 *tada* alliances and *leff* alliances. Of these, *tada* alliances are the least inclusive, generally being established by covenant between two divisions or even two tribes already linked by some form of ethnic 628 tie. Although *tada* alliances are not unknown among the Shluh (see 571 for example, Westermarck, 1926, Vol. 1, p. 526), they are most 171 frequent among the transhumants, here having vitally important economic functions. As with the *taimat*, or *tagmat*, the symbolism of the *tada* alliance emphasizes the establishment of ties of brotherhood between the two groups; this is clearly expressed among the Beni Ouarain (241-267), where the two groups exchange containers of milk, the contents of which are then poured on the ground between to symbolize the nourishment of both groups by the milk of a common mother, such symbolism is also occasionally resorted to in the casting of *'ar* on the *amur* type alliance (type 2, Table V), when a fugitive touches a woman, pretends to suck her breast, sits down in front of her, or turns her handmill – for he thus becomes, as it were, her son. Among the Ait Atta (465-491) this symbolic act is reserved for the ceremony of *afergant*, a *tada* alliance being established instead by a ceremony of covenanting involving the exchange of slippers or cloaks (Bruno and Bousquet, 1946, pp. 365-368; Deverdun, 1942, p. 314, Marcy, 1929, p. 142; Spillmann,

4: Hoffman E-4 (no date) 1967 MW11 Shluh MW11 (ca. 1900)

1936, pp. 50-51; Westermarck, 1926, Vol. 1, pp. 564-567). 628

Among the transhumants *tagma* and *tada* alliances are employed 571
first and foremost to control and regularize occupancy of pasture- 171
lands – a function particularly important in those regions. such as the Middle Atlas, where each area, upon becoming vacated by the departure of one group, is immediately reoccupied by one coming up from the rear. In such a situation, the existence of the alliance enables the councils of the allied groups to designate lands of common pasturage, in which members of the two groups may graze their sheep successively or together. Only under such circumstances does grazing take place freely and without molestation. In fact, good relations between two groups occupying the same territory is inconceivable without the existence of a *tada* alliance, for this alliance not only opens the way for common use of the land, but also prohibits theft, adultery, or other injury (Bruno and Bousquet, 1946, pp. 366-368).

Leff alliances differ from *tada* alliances in involving many more 571
groups and covering much larger areas; furthermore they charac- 628
teristically involve the alignment of politically independent districts 616
or tribes into two balanced and opposed units known as *leff* (pl. 634
lfuf) in Arabic, as *ameqqon* (pl. *imeqqon*) in Tashilhait, and as 635
tafergant in Tamazight. These units characteristically form a checkerboard or mosaic structure which may cut boldly across both tribal and confederation boundaries, allying, for example, districts of one tribe with districts in another and putting them into opposition with districts within their own tribe (see Fig. 7); they thus present a pattern in which each district or tribe is usually bordered by some of the same and some of the opposite *leff* unit. In areas where the *leff* structure was still strong in the pre-Protectorate period, such as among the Shluh and Beraber, and in the western Jebala, the *leff* units seem to have functioned primarily to provide mutual assistance in defensive war. Among the Shluh and the [171]
Riffians the units were characteristically permanent – dividing the population into traditional moieties; among the Beraber realignments were more common; among the Arabic-speakers the *leff* structures were characteristically unstable, and also demonstrated disintegration resulting from the natural antagonism of the *Makh-*

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4: Hoffman E-4 (no date) 1967 MW11 Shluh MW11 (ca. 1900)

zen to such a competitive political system (Adams, 1953, p. 33; Coon, 1931, pp. 105-108; Deverdun, 1942, pp. 306-307; Doutté, 1905; Montagne, 1930, pp. 182-216; Murdock, 1956, pp. 142-143; Spillmann, 1936, pp. 49-52; see also Berque, 1955, pp. 424-439, for a critique of the *leff* theory).

Just as the *tada* alliance between extended groups represents an extension of the *tagmat* or "brotherhood" alliance between individuals and families, so the *leff* alliance represents a still further extension of fictional brotherhood between extended groups. This is clearly illustrated among the Ait Atta (465-491), where the pact of *tafergant* ("interdiction"), renewed annually, is marked by a "ceremony of milk" symbolizing the fiction of a common mother, and involves a prohibition upon the men to marry, or even to "look" upon, the women of the opposite group. Among the Shluh the *leff* alliance is renewed or revitalized annually by great festivals and "rounds of hospitality" (*tinoubga*), in which the ties of brotherhood between the *leff* members are reemphasized, and in the course of which many private associations, family alliances, and marriages are also contracted (Berque, 1955, pp. 425-426; Montagne, 1930, pp. 187-191; Spillmann, 1936, pp. 50-51).

Among the Shluh of the High Atlas and Anti-Atlas the political importance of the *leff* units was very great in pre-Protectorate times, the balance of power between the two divisions usually acting as a strong restraint against agressive action. If a Shluh district was, in fact, attacked by another, the defenders despatched messengers to the border of their *leff* allies to fire gunshot signals, a few hours after which the forces of the victimized *leff* began to pour across the border to give battle to the aggressor. In such a case the *leff* allies of the aggressor generally did not also intervene, but if they did, as frequently happened in the Tiznit area, the outcome was a general war throughout the area of the *leff* structure (Montagne, 1930, pp. 187, 202-203).

c. *Intervention*

Although but a single *leff* structure existed in northern Morocco during the early 20th century, the importance of this system varied greatly within this region, being strongest in the western Jebala and